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Taxable Income and Accounting Bases
for Determining It *
By George O. May
Introduction
On various occasions when the question has arisen, I have been
impressed by the uncertainties and misconceptions shown to
exist concerning accounting bases for determining income for tax
purposes and in regard to the significance of such terms as “the
cash basis” and “the accrual basis” commonly employed in tax
practice. It has therefore seemed to me to be worth while to
devote some time to a consideration of this subject and in so
doing to go back over the developments affecting it since the
passage of the corporation-excise-tax law in 1909.
As a preliminary to such consideration it seems necessary to
inquire to some extent into the nature of taxable income, but I do
not propose to go into this very large subject except in so far as
may be necessary to an intelligent discussion of the accounting
bases for determining income. To allay still further any anxiety
created by the comprehensiveness of the title of this paper, I will
add that I shall confine myself to commercial income, which
constitutes the major part of the taxable income of the country
and presents the more difficult problems and I shall not discuss
personal, professional or investment income.
In income taxation, the first problem is to define income and
the second to allocate income in respect of time. The question of
allocation to sources geographically arises in some cases and
presents some difficulties, but this question affects only a re
stricted field.
The problem of definition resolves itself mainly into a choice
between several different concepts of the nature of the income
and, though important, is relatively simple. The more serious
difficulties are encountered in determining when income emerges
from the complicated business transactions of modern commerce
so as to be properly taxable.
The accounting bases employed in determining income affect
the time when income becomes taxable rather than the amount of
income ultimately taxable and this paper therefore has to do
* A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants at
Washington, D. C., September 15, 1925.
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mainly with the time element in taxation. This is conspicuously
a case where “time is of the essence”. Whether an amount is to
be deemed taxable in a year of high war taxes or in some remote
future year may be of far more practical importance than whether
the whole or only a part is to be finally taxed.
What Is Taxable Income

Since 1913 our income-tax laws have been enacted under the
authority of the sixteenth amendment to the constitution, which
authorized congress to tax without apportionment among the
several states “incomes from whatever source derived”.
Now there are numerous theories as to what is income. In one
case (Doyle v. Mitchell) the government argued that the gross
proceeds of sale were income. Economists sometimes argue that
earnings that are saved are not income, so that what is income is
determined by how what comes in is subsequently expended.
Apart, however, from any such extreme views, there are two
materially different theories of income which are supported by
considerable authority: One holds that income is necessarily gain,
the other that it may be in part a conversion of capital.
The difference may be illustrated by the case of a man pur
chasing an annuity. The general public regards the whole of the
annuity as his income and this view is shared, I think, by many
economists and reflected in the English and probably other tax
laws. The actuary and the accountant would, however, insist
that only in part is the annuity rightfully called income, a part
being a realization of capital.
Congress in 1913 might, I suppose, have adopted either of these
theories and if its intent had been clearly manifested the supreme
court would hardly have rejected that theory.
This, however, congress did not do. The clauses of the 1913
and 1916 acts purporting to define income or gross income, as
definitions, left much to be desired. What are we to infer from
the definition of income as including “gains, profits and income”
from certain specified sources “or from any source whatever”?
Is income something different from gains and profits, and if so,
what is the distinction? In section 4 of the act of 1916 congress
provided that annuities in so far as they represented returns of
premiums were not taxable income, but in doing so it in plain
language characterized them as income; the 1918 law retained the
exemption but avoided the characterization [Sec. 213 (a)].
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It might fairly be argued that congress, taking the acts as a
whole, indicated an intention to tax only gains. This view is
supported by the provisions above mentioned and by those
allowing depreciation and depletion. On the other hand, the
fact that these items were allowed by way of deductions from
income or gross income in arriving at taxable income, the limita
tion of the deductions in purely arbitrary ways, and the language
of section 4 of the act of 1916 above alluded to, might be claimed
to support the view that congress intended to assert the right to
tax as income what might be in part a conversion of capital, but
not to exercise its rights to that extent.
However this may be, the supreme court presumably settled
the matter when in the case of Eisner v. Macomber it defined
income as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined.
This decision, for the reason that it contained the definition I
have referred to and held that congress had attempted to tax as
income what was not income, is of great importance and it may
be worth while to discuss it briefly. Many passages from the
opinion are of interest to accountants but I will quote only one
paragraph:
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard
Diet.; Webster’s Internat. Diet.; Century Diet.), we find little to add to
the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the corporation
tax act of 1909 (Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415;
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185)—“ Income may be defined
as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,”
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or con
version of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle case (pp.
183, 185).

In the dictionaries cited, both of the views of income above
mentioned are set forth; the definition coming closest to that
adopted by the court is found in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.
Reference to the decision in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, in
which the definition was first used, discloses that in that case the
court was at pains to point out that, as at the time of the passage
of the 1909 law congress had no power to levy a general income
tax without apportionment, the theoretical distinctions between
capital and income were of little value to the court in interpreting
that statute. Curiously enough also, the case was one in which the
court sustained the taxation as income of the proceeds of gold
mining without any provision for the exhaustion of the capital rep
resented by the mine. In Doyle v. Mitchell, arising under the same
250
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act, the court adopted the same definition in a decision in which it
ruled that the proceeds of lumbering could not be taxed as income
without a deduction for the capital value of the timber exhausted.
However, these decisions being rendered under the excise-tax
law, have no necessary bearing on the present question; and in
Eisner v. Macomber which was decided under an income-tax
law, none of these special features was present.
Just how far reaching the effect of that decision is in law is a
question for lawyers. The supreme court decisions under the
excise-tax law of 1909 rather suggest that congress can levy an
excise tax measured by income without availing of the sixteenth
amendment and in so doing can define income as it pleases with
out regard to the views of the supreme court or any one else. So
long, however, as it levies a tax on income it apparently can not
tax as income what the supreme court does not consider to be
income.
The point is largely academic and congress has not shown any
disposition to disagree with the general interpretation of income
adopted by the court. The two bodies have, it is true, differed
on the question whether stock dividends are income; but dividends
constitute a special problem and are, both under the acts and
under court decisions, an exception to the rule that there is no
income unless there is gain. If an investor buys $100 shares of a
company which has a surplus equal to its capital stock for $200 a
share and if the next day the company pays a dividend of $100 a
share and its shares fall to par, the dividend is not gain to the
investor whether the dividend is paid in stock or cash. Dividends
are however, in general, income and it is so manifestly impossible
to provide for treatment thereof varying according to the cir
cumstances surrounding the holders’ acquisition of the stock on
which the dividend is paid, that purchasers of stocks of companies
having large earned surpluses may reasonably be expected to
realize that in making such purchases they not only acquire the
prospects of dividends out of profits earned prior to their purchase
but also assume the burden of any tax on the dividends they may
receive. It was for this reason that Mr. Justice Pitney in the
Phellis case said the hardship in the case of such purchasers was
more apparent than real. It is on similar grounds that supporters
of the English system justify its treatment of the proceeds of an
annuity or of mining and similar operations as taxable income
without any deduction for exhaustion of capital. In this con
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nection it is pertinent to point out that the English income tax
has been levied continuously since 1842 and that therefore the
great expansion of industry and corporate enterprise has taken
place mainly with notice of the burdens in the form of income tax
to which it might be subject.
Other similar cases may arise where something which is not gain
is taxed as income. It would probably be a fairly accurate
statement to say that the general test of the existence of income is
whether there is gain, but that items which ordinarily constitute
gain and are commonly regarded as income may be taxed as such
even though in exceptional cases they may not result in a gain to
the recipient.
As regards commercial operations there are probably few ex
ceptions to the rule that income must be in the nature of gain.
Gain in commercial business is, however, usually not a separate
item but a difference between items on opposite sides of the ac
count. On the one side are the proceeds of sale, on the other the
costs involved in producing the sales. Frequently also the gain
is the result of a series of transactions or a gradual process ex
tending over two or more distinct tax periods. If a taxpayer buys
raw materials in one year, manufactures finished goods therefrom
in another, sells those goods in a third and collects the proceeds in
a fourth year, the ultimate gain is obviously not attributable
wholly to any one of these four years nor is there any way of al
locating portions of the gain to the operations of the several years
which can be said to be the scientific and only proper way. In
one such series of transactions the main factor contributing to the
gain may be cheapness of buying, in another low cost of manu
facture, in another advantageous selling and so on. Further, the
transactions of a taxpayer are frequently so interrelated that we
can not ascertain the profits of any given series separately. Com
mercial profit is in fact, as an eminent English judge puts it, neces
sarily a matter of estimate and opinion.
In the determination of income for commercial purposes the
best practice is to be governed by considerations of conservatism.
Profits are not taken except when and to the extent that they are
received or at least reasonably assured. Losses that are foreseen
are provided for even though not actually sustained or measured.
The legislature naturally approaches the question from a rather
different point of view. On the first point it may be questioned
whether congress has power to tax profits not actually received.
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On the second, if it allows actual losses as deductions it can hardly
be expected to allow deductions for potential future losses to be
made at the discretion of the taxpayer.
It should be said at once that congress has shown no disposition
either to tax income not received or to deny losses actually sus
tained. Indeed in at least one important instance it has deliber
ately allowed the anticipation of potential losses. The provision in
the 1918 act that inventories shall be taken on the basis conforming
to the best trade practice was enacted with the knowledge that one
of the best trade practices was to value inventories at cost where
cost was less than market and at market where that was less than
cost, thus anticipating a loss wherever market might be below
cost. This recognition of one of the best established of those
trade practices which find their justification not in logic or scien
tific considerations, but in conservatism and practical wisdom is
very significant. In 1921 also the law was amended to permit
deduction of a reasonable reserve for bad debts instead of only
debts ascertained to be worthless, thus recognizing another well
established trade practice.
Whether the deductions permitted for depreciation and deple
tion are properly regarded as provisions for anticipated losses is
difficult to say. From the accounting standpoint the provisions
for depletion and depreciation of manufacturing plant are ele
ments of cost, which must be provided for before there can be said
to be any gain. The decisions of the supreme court on this
branch of the subject are not altogether easy to reconcile either
with one another or with the court’s general definition of income.
Quite apart from the decision in the Stratton's Independence case,
under the 1909 law, the significance of which may be lessened by
the fact that the claimants were asserting that all the proceeds of
mining were capital, the court has approved under an income-tax
law a purely arbitrary limitation on the depletion allowance
which it would seem could hardly have been sustained except on
grounds which would have applied equally to the total denial of
any deduction. This in turn would seem to mean that depletion
is not a factor necessarily taken into account in determining
the gain.
One other point may be noted. In general our laws have taxed
the income of the taxpayer from his business, which may be less
than the total gain from the business to the extent of the portion
of the economic gain which the taxpayer may be required to pay
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over to others in the form of interest, rentals and other participa
tions. In this respect ours has differed from the English system,
which assesses against the taxpayer carrying on the business the
entire gain from that business without regard to any such distribu
tions, leaving the equitable adjustment between taxpayers to be
effected by a system of deductions by the taxpayer when making
the distributions, and refunds by the revenue to the distributees if
they should be exempt from tax. In the act of 1909 and the in
come-tax acts up to that of 1918, however, the interest deduction
allowed to corporations was arbitrarily limited and the limitation
was sustained by the courts. Here again the power to impose
purely arbitrary limitations on the deduction would seem neces
sarily to imply power to deny any deductions whatever. In the
cases which came before the court the objection urged was ap
parently that the limitation was discriminatory and the decisions
may, therefore, not be authority for the proposition that congress
has the power to tax all that is economically income in the hands
of the person who realizes the income, even though it is not all
income to that person. The point might become important, for a
tax so levied without some provision for the proper adjustment of
the burden between the ultimate beneficiaries of the gain might
easily result in a tax on a person receiving the income greater than
the portion thereof which he might be entitled to retain. In the
year 1917 the limitation on interest deductions undoubtedly
worked some hardship, and would have caused gross injustice but
for the action of the commissioner in allowing, without any very
obvious warrant in the law, the capital sum corresponding to the
interest disallowed to be treated as invested capital.
While the arbitrary limitations to which I have referred, and
which are now fortunately removed, were blemishes on the earlier
acts, criticism of the methods of determining taxable income
established by those acts must be directed mainly at their lack of
precision and clarity and their failure to recognize business
methods and considerations of practical convenience.
Bases of Accounting for Income Historically Considered
It is perhaps not surprising that at the outset receipt or pay
ment in cash should have been adopted as the general basis for
inclusion of items in income-tax returns. Legislation is framed
and interpreted largely by lawyers, and lawyers apparently seek
to atone for the bewildering complexities they have introduced
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into their own sphere of activity by insisting on the utmost
simplicity in other spheres. The legal mind that distrusts simple
interest and regards compound interest as wholly pernicious
is naturally suspicious of any account more complex than a cash
account. In Great Britain, the home of the income tax, this
tendency has been manifest but in regard to commercial income it
has been counteracted by another principle of judicial action,
the principle that in commercial affairs the established practices
of business men are a better guide than rules framed by theorists.
Consequently the courts there have always held that the deter
mination of income from business was a business problem and
that in the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary,
established trade practices must be followed even though to the
revenue authorities or even the court those practices might
seem theoretically unsound or illogical.
An excellent illustration is found in the methods of valuing
inventories, the English courts having sustained both the “cost
or market” basis and the “basic stock” method where a practice
in the trade was shown to exist and there was no statutory pro
hibition.
In our case, however, the tendency towards the cash basis was
perhaps strengthened by the accident that our first income tax was
enacted in the guise of an excise tax.
The law of 1909 was framed so as to provide that corporations
should return income actually received and expenses actually
paid. As soon as this became known the accountants vigorously
protested to the attorney general that such a basis ignored the
nature and practices of modern business and would entail in
convenience that would be more burdensome than the tax. The
attorney general, however, remained unmoved by their protest,
said that the straight cash basis was adopted advisedly and
retorted that he had too much confidence in the ability of the
accountants to think that they would find the difficulties of
complying with the law unsurmountable.
The attorney general’s confidence was apparently justified for
with the assistance of accountants the secretary of the treasury
issued regulations which certainly presented no special difficulties
to taxpayers.
Some have thought that the authors of those regulations found
their inspiration where so many others have found inspiration,
in the works of W. S. Gilbert. Certainly when one reads the
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provisions to the effect that the term “actually paid” does not
necessarily contemplate that there shall have been an actual
disbursement of cash or even its equivalent and that an item is
paid as soon as a taxpayer recognizes that it has to be paid one is
irresistibly reminded of Koko’s explanation to the Mikado of his
statement that Nanki Poo had been executed when in fact he was
still alive.
When your Majesty says, “let a thing be done,” it’s as good as done,—
practically it is done,—because your Majesty’s will is law. Your Majesty
says, "Kill a gentleman,” and a gentleman is told off to be killed. Con
sequently, that gentleman is as good as dead, practically, he is dead, and
if he is dead, why not say so?

It is, however, quite possible to find a more logical justification
for the method of determining net income established by the
regulations at least in the main, though this justification I admit
does not extend to the language in which the method is prescribed
and ostensibly justified.
The act of 1909 provided that the “net income” which was
subjected to tax should be determined by deducting “from the
gross amount of the income ... received within the year from
all sources. ”
First. "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year out
of income in the maintenance and operation of its business and proper
ties including all charges such as rentals or franchise payments required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession of property.”
Second. "All losses actually sustained within the year and not com
pensated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for
depreciation of property if any.”
Third. "Interest actually paid within the year” subject to specified
limits.
Fourth. All sums paid within the year for taxes.
Fifth. Dividends from other companies subject to the tax.

The regulations regarding commercial income apparently ig
nored the word “ received ” just as fully as the word “ paid ”. It was
not necessary that proceeds of sale should have been received in
order that there should be taxable income therefrom. The
regulation treated income from sales as received when the goods
were exchanged for an account or note receivable or cash. This
was, in ordinary cases, an obviously convenient rule (and in
considering the almost complete acquiescence these regulations
secured it must always be borne in mind that the tax was so small
as to make it not worth while to fight a reasonably convenient
rule) but whether if challenged it would have been sustained is
open to question. The courts have pointed out that the ex
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pectation of gain in the future is not present income and have
been reluctant to sustain a tax where nothing had been received
out of which the tax could be paid. The justification of the
regulation would have had to be found in the argument that
something equivalent to cash had been received, and in many
classes of transactions the recognition of the principle of cash
equivalence must be conceded to be practically essential to an
effective income-tax administration. Once this principle is
adopted, however, it has to be admitted that in measuring the
gain the proceeds must be reduced to a true cash equivalent.
This would mean bringing provisions for the cost of collection,
for discounts and for credit risks into account at the same time as
the sale itself, which it may be noted the regulations did not
permit.
The next point to be observed is that the proceeds of sale are
not income (Doyle v. Mitchel!); only so much as is gain is income.
Assuming therefore that the gain is received when the proceeds of
sale are received (not necessarily in cash) it follows that all costs
attributable to the sale must be brought into account at the same
time as the sale itself, whether such costs have or have not been
paid. Otherwise on balance something which is not gain will
inevitably have been brought into account and taxed as income.
It is generally recognized that this is true of the direct cost of the
goods sold but it is not so universally understood that it is equally
true of the cost of making the sale and the cost of collecting the
proceeds. A commission paid in order to effect a sale is as much
an element in determining the gain therefrom as the cost of the
property sold. This point seems to me to have a most important
bearing on the determination of taxable income whether the
question be approached from the theoretical, historical, or prac
tical standpoint.
In considering the proper treatment of any item in relation to
taxable income the first essential is to decide whether it properly
relates to the determination of gross income or to a deduction
from gross income. If the former, its treatment is not in any way
affected by any limitations of deductions to amounts paid,
accrued or incurred, as the case may be, since these limitations
apply only to items which are in fact charges against gross income
after gross income has been determined. As the court indicated
in Doyle v. Mitchell it is immaterial whether there is any express
provision allowing elements in the production of gross income as
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deductions from gross proceeds for until they are deducted there
is nothing ascertained which congress can properly tax as income.
This principle would have warranted a regulation that all costs
of effecting sales, as well as the costs of producing the goods sold
and provisions for the costs of collection, were allowable in the
period in which the sales were returned, as a part of the computa
tion of gross income. Only expenses not falling under any of
these three heads would have been left to be taken as deductions
under the head of “ordinary and necessary expenses actually
paid within the year out of income.”
Looking back on the problem of 1909 in the flood of light which
the developments of the last sixteen years have thrown on the
subject one feels that along such lines a solution might have been
found that would have been almost as convenient as the one
adopted and would have avoided interpreting the words “actu
ally paid” in the Gilbertian manner of the regulation then pro
mulgated. It may be suggested that the language of the provi
sion for deduction for business expenses stood in the way, but this
does not seem to be necessarily so. That provision authorized
the “deducting from the gross amount of the income all the
ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid within the year
out of income.” Expenditures necessarily made to produce
income surely did not fall in any such category. In point of fact
expenses of maintenance of the property of the taxpayer were
specifically enumerated in the act among the “ordinary and
necessary expenses” yet the regulations provided that expendi
tures for maintenance of manufacturing plant should be included
in cost of goods sold in computing gross income and not under the
deduction.
The regulations of 1909 did not follow the course I have sug
gested but treated only cost of goods as a deduction from sales
in determining gross income and dealt with cost of selling and
collection as “ordinary or necessary expenses” to be deducted
from gross income when “actually paid ” providing, however, that
when such items were duly set up on the books they were “actu
ally paid” within the meaning of the law.
The convenience of the solution is undeniable and it may be
that the framers were governed by this consideration. They may
well have felt that the solution was so convenient that no one
would be likely to challenge it, and that if it were challenged they
could readily show that it produced erroneous results only as
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regards expenses which were not a part of the cost of effecting and
collecting the sales returned, the amount of which was in ordinary
cases relatively insignificant.
In substance these regulations were sound, convenient and did
little real violence to the language of the law. Their form, how
ever, must be admitted to have been defective particularly in its
apparent disregard of the language of the law. No doubt if con
tinued interest in the work of administering the law by men of
the quality of those who framed the regulations could have been
secured, the defects in form would have been corrected, while
the advantages of the substance would have been retained.
This, however, was not possible and in the event just the opposite
result followed. The influence of the defective form has continued
long after the advantages derived from the substance have ceased
to be felt.
One result of the defective form was that a widespread feeling
was created both within and without the department that the
regulations were at variance with the law and that any day dis
satisfaction with their operation in a particular case might bring
the issue into court and cause the whole house of cards to collapse.
Another result was that the average taxpayer who was told that
when used in connection with expenses the word “paid” did not
necessarily mean a disbursement in cash, but that when used in
relation to interest or taxes it did contemplate such a disburse
ment, felt that the law was unreasonable and so far as he was con
cerned incomprehensible. Still another result, certainly of a
most unexpected character, which I shall discuss later in this
paper, grew out of the establishment by the regulations of the
making of book entries as a criterion of deductibility, a criterion
not warranted, either in theory or in the language of the law.
Further, while the solution by the secretary of the treasury of
the problem presented in the act of 1909 produced immediate
benefits in the form of convenience, it stood in the way of efforts
to secure a more satisfactory wording when in 1913 the first
income-tax law was enacted. Efforts to secure an improvement
were made by, among others, the American Association of Public
Accountants. The suggestion of a change was met with the
argument that the existing law had in practice worked quite
satisfactorily and that if such a law could be applied to corpora
tions there was even greater justification for applying it to indi
viduals, most of whom would keep no books and would make
259

The Journal of Accountancy

returns on a purely cash basis. The law of 1913 thus followed
closely the language of the law of 1909. The efforts were, how
ever, continued and in 1916 a modification was effected and tax
payers were given the option of making returns either on the
statutory basis or on the basis on which their books were kept,
provided the method of keeping the books was such as in the
opinion of the commissioner correctly reflected income. For
various reasons which it is hardly necessary at this time to dis
cuss, this provision did not work very well, and the regulations
under the 1916 act continued to follow very closely those made
under the acts of 1909 and 1913.
In passing it may be pointed out that article 126 of regulations
No. 33 issued January 2, 1918, strongly suggests that at the time
those regulations were issued the line of reasoning which I have
put forward above as an alternative to that indicated by the lan
guage of 1909 regulations had developed in the bureau. It
begins by apparently flouting the language of the statute in the
most open and flagrant manner. The first sentence reads "‘paid’
or ‘actually paid’ within the meaning of this title, does not neces
sarily contemplate that there shall be an actual disbursement in
cash or its equivalent.” The next sentence, however, states very
succinctly the underlying justification of the results of the regula
tion which I have suggested. “ If the amount involved represents
an actual expense or element of cost in the production of the income
of the year, it will be properly deductible even though not actu
ally disbursed in cash, provided it is so entered upon the books of
the company as to constitute a liability against its assets, and
provided further that the income is also returned upon an accrued
basis.”
It will be observed that this regulation does not in terms permit
the deduction of any expense which has not actually been paid
unless it is “an expense or element of cost in the production of the
income”. To support such a position it was not necessary to
give a forced construction to the words “actually paid” used in
the statute. In practice, however, the regulation was applied to
all business expenses and the bureau no doubt preferred to retain
substantially the language of the regulations under the acts of
1909 and 1913 and to be in a position to invoke the rule that
re-enactment of the provisions of an act by congress with a knowl
edge of the way in which it has been interpreted sanctions that
interpretation.
260
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When in 1917 the excess-profits-tax law was passed levying high
taxes on the income determined under the 1916 law and regula
tions the whole question assumed new importance and the need
for revision of the law became apparent.
In the 1918 law, therefore, it was provided (in section 212) that
returns should be made on the basis on which the taxpayer’s books
were kept unless that basis did not clearly reflect income, in
which case returns were to be made on such basis as the commis
sioner might prescribe as clearly reflecting income.
In considering this section it is important to bear in mind the
provisions of the act that the terms paid or incurred (used in
relation to deductions for expenses) and paid or accrued (used in
relation to deductions for interest and taxes) should be construed
according to the method of accounting used in computing net
income.
Even more important, however, is the provision that items of
gross income were to be included in returns for the taxable year
in which received unless under methods of accounting permitted
under section 212 they were properly accounted for as of a differ
ent period.
The intent seems clear to give the fullest effect to sound ac
counting practice in the determination of gross income. It may
be conceded that the law gave no authority to the commissioner
to prescribe or permit bases of accounting which would result in
deductions from the gross income of expenses in periods other
than those in which they were paid or incurred or of interest and
taxes in periods other than that of payment or accrual. In
curred, however, is a sufficiently broad term and no serious criti
cism of the rules thus established could be offered by the most
ardent advocate of the policy of allowing commercial practice to
govern the determination of commercial income. The law cer
tainly authorized the acceptance of well established practices for
determining gross income on the basis of the fair present value of
the sales price, instead of its face value, in other words the exclu
sion from the computation of gross income of so much of the
nominal sale price as might be necessary to provide for discounts,
for the credit risk assumed and the cost of collecting that sale
price. It did not permit deduction from gross income of reserves
for potential future losses nor for expenditures not yet incurred
and not involved in the production of the gross sales reported.
From the legislative standpoint such deductions could not rea-
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sonably be allowed, however legitimate or even praiseworthy
purely precautionary reserves may be from the standpoints of
sound finance and business prudence.
To most accountants the act of 1918 seemed to dispose of the
vitally important question of accounting bases for determining
taxable income in a sound and satisfactory way.
It can hardly be said that the expectations entertained have
been fully realized. The regulations (reg. 45) seemed to observe
the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Article 23, for instance,
provided that “approved standard methods of accounting will
ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income” and article 24
said “the law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such
forms and systems of accounting as are in his judgment best
suited to his purpose.” In such articles as 151 the propriety of
computing gross income upon the basis of the cash equivalent
rather than the face value of credit sales was recognized. Other
articles explicitly recognized approved alternative methods of
treating expenditures in the twilight zone between obviously
capital expenditure and ordinary operating expense. In adminis
tration the law has frequently been construed with less breadth
and with less regard for its spirit. In part this is perhaps attribu
table to failure to realize the nature of the problem of determining
the income of a single year.
Accountants realize that income can not with even approximate
accuracy be allocated to a particular year, especially in the case of
taxpayers carrying on an extensive and complex business. No
year is sufficient unto itself—each year’s operations are bound up
with and dependent on the operations of earlier and later years.
Consequently, any attribution of income to a single year in such
cases must at best be no more than a very rough approximation
based on accepted conventions. Many, however, who have not
had much experience in such matters look on the income of a year
as a very definite, significant and even a precise thing. They are
reluctant to accept the proposition that there can be two ways of
determining the income of a given year, which will give substan
tially different results and be equally admissible and correct.
Experience suggests that such reluctance was very general among
those in the bureau of internal revenue and when the 1918 act
compelled recognition of the principle that there might be more
than one legally correct way of computing income for a given year,
they apparently resolved at least to limit the number of alterna262
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tives. Since the passage of the 1918 act the correspondence and
briefs of the bureau have contained constant references to the
two bases of accounting permitted under the act, these two being
described respectively as “the cash basis” and “the accrual
basis.” Of course, the more experienced members of the bureau
realized that there were far more than two bases of accounting
possible and recognized under the act, and doubtless many of those
who spoke of the cash basis and the accrual basis used the latter
term generically to describe anything other than a cash basis.
But to a large number of the employees of the bureau the accrual
basis has become not merely a significant phrase, but an article of
faith. Indeed, one can almost imagine such employees of the
bureau scattered over the land turning their faces towards the
treasury daily at the appointed hour and reciting their creed,
“There is but one accrual basis and the Bureau is its
prophet”.

“The Accrual Basis”
It may be worth while to inquire just what is meant by “the
accrual basis.” This is by no means clear nor is it even clear
precisely how it differs from the so-called cash basis as applied to
commercial income since 1909.
It will be evident from what I have already said that both in
theory and in practice cash has very little to do (in the case of
commercial enterprises) with the determination of income on the
“cash” basis and very little reflection is necessary to a realization
of the fact that accruals (in any proper sense of the word) have
still less to do with the determination of income on the so-called
accrual basis. This fact has been obscured by the practice, which
has grown up, of using the word ‘‘accrue ” in senses hardly dreamed
of before the revenue act of 1916 was passed. The bureau, having
adopted “the accrual basis” as the only alternative to “the cash
basis,” has proceeded to term “an accrual” almost everything
that is not a cash item. Thus, we find the bureau speaking of
taking up an inventory as an accrual and of “accruing accounts
receivable from sales” and quite generally using the word
“accrue” in a transitive sense as being equivalent to the “setting
up on the books” which as I have pointed out was under the
regulations of 1909 established as being for tax purposes equiva
lent to actual payment. Applying Euclidean methods, we may
deduce that since setting up on the books is equivalent to actual
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payment or receipt and is also equivalent to accrual, and since
things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,
accrual is equivalent to actual payment or receipt and the cash
basis and the accrual basis are identical. Such use of the word
“accrual” could not have been justified from the dictionary nor
from common accounting or business practice. Indeed the latest
citation in any standard dictionary of the use of the word “accrue ”
in any transitive sense whatever, that I have been able to discover,
is from a work published in 1594.
The fact is, that the word “accrue” is a singularly unhappy
choice for use in income-tax practice. One of the great difficulties
of income taxation is that income earning is a gradual process and
yet the necessities of taxation require that particular portions of
income shall be attributed to particular moments in time. It is
not feasible to tax income during the period of growth but only
when it becomes definite and measurable. Now in its basic mean
ings, the word “accrual” is ambiguous when applied to such a
situation because one of its meanings is to “grow up” and the
other is to “spring up” or “fall in,” so that it is equally capable of
application either to the period of growth or to the moment of
falling in of income when it takes a definite form. There is a
similar ambiguity in the legal and commercial uses of the word.
When the term “accrue” is used in regard to interest, the
reference is usually intended to be to the gradual accumulation of
interest between one maturity date and another. In regard to
taxes, it has repeatedly been held to mean “become due.” The
use of the word in the recent acts has been sufficiently confusing
in that the two deductions in respect of which it has been used in
the acts are interest and taxes, two items in relation to which it
has quite different meanings. When to such ambiguities is added
the further confusion arising from the use of the word by the
bureau in the transitive sense as equivalent to “set up,” its last
shred of descriptive value disappears.
One may wonder why of all the terms used in the acts this term,
which is the least illuminating, should have attained the widest
use in the bureau. Partly, no doubt, it is due to the fact that of
the various terms used such as “paid,” “received” and “in
curred,” “accrued” is the only one from which an adjective is
easily formed that is applicable to both sides of the account.
Its use therefore achieved brevity, though at a complete sacrifice
of significance. However this may be, I venture to suggest that
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the misuse of the word “accrue” has contributed to the confusion
of the income-tax administration in the later stages as much as
the artificial solution of the problem presented by the words
“paid” and “received” in the act of 1909 occasioned in the
earlier stages.
Before leaving the subject, I would like to admit that the ac
countants are not wholly without responsibility for the confusion
that has existed. Our own use of terminology is lamentably
inconsistent and reflects too often the idiosyncrasies of the indi
vidual rather than the established practice of the profession.
I recall a statement put forward over the signature of a well
known accounting firm which began with a figure described as
“gross income” from which allowances and refunds were deducted
to arrive at a figure described as “net gross income.” Operating
expenses were next deducted and the result described as “net
operating income”; the addition to which of net income from
other sources produced a so-called “gross net income” which it
must be observed meant something quite different from “net
gross income.” Our treatment of cost of goods, cost of selling
and cost of collecting in relation to gross income has too often
been determined by habit rather than by logic. Many of us have
acquiesced in or even adopted the bureau’s unwarranted usage
of “the accrual basis.” Burdened with so much responsibility,
we must be restrained in our criticisms of the bureau which, facing
a heavier task and equipped with less experience, has fallen into
errors similar to our own.
Conclusion

We may now, I hope, look forward to rates that will be lower
and more stable than in recent years with a resulting reduction of
the temptation to taxpayers to allow their accounting methods to
be influenced by tax considerations. If so, there will be even
more reason than in the past why the bureau should carry out
the obvious intent of the law and adopt a broad policy towards
taxpayers’ accounting methods, which will make the law less
burdensome in procedure as well as in amount.
In order to accomplish this result some old misconceptions need
to be removed and some old truths emphasized anew. It would
greatly improve the administration of the income tax if the bureau
generally—not merely those who frame regulations but all
charged with the administration of the law—would realize that
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“the accrual basis’’ is a meaningless phrase; that the choice today
is not between a so-called “cash basis’’ and a so-called “accrual
basis’’ but between the basis on which the taxpayers’ books are
kept and the basis prescribed by the commissioner as clearly
reflecting income; and that as stated in regulations 45, article 24,
the law contemplates that “each taxpayer shall adopt such forms
and systems of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to
his purpose.”
They should keep constantly in mind the fundamental differ
ence between the considerations governing the determination of
gross income and those governing the treatment of authorized
deductions from such gross income. In this connection they
should realize that the mention of any class of items among the
authorized deductions from gross income does not stand in the
way of the deduction of similar items from gross proceeds in the
determination of gross income where they are a part of the cost of
producing that income.
For instance, the provision that taxes may be deducted either
when paid or when accrued does not stand in the way of customs
duties accrued and paid last year entering into the determination
of the income of this year if the goods imported are sold this year.
Similarly the provision that debts actually ascertained to be
worthless may be claimed as deductions does not stand in the
way of valuing sales accounts receivable at their fair market value
at the time when they are created, in determining the gross in
come from such sales, but merely limits the deduction which may
subsequently be claimed for bad debts if the account receivable
proves uncollectible.
They should never forget that income is at best a matter of
estimate and opinion, and that in its allocation in respect of time,
business practice and the treatment adopted in good faith by the
taxpayer are entitled to great weight; also that the injustice of
taxation of income which has not been received may not be ade
quately remedied by allowing the amount as a so-called loss
against the income from other transactions in a later year. Both
the law and business practice warrant conservatism in determin
ing when income is received and is taxable.
These are the practical conclusions which seem to me to emerge
from consideration of our subject. I hope you will feel that they
give some present value to this paper, which otherwise might seem
to have at best only historical interest.
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